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introduction by Judith rodin 
President, The Rockefeller Foundation 
The Rockefeller Foundation’s mission to promote the well-being of humanity has 
remained unchanged since its founding in 1913. In a rapidly changing world, we 
use an innovative and interconnected systems-based approach that combines civil 
society, private and public sector resources to solve social problems.
It was with this collaborative approach in mind and our goal to find solutions from 
unlikely sources that the Foundation embarked on its innovation initiative, which 
aims to test whether new innovative approaches can be applied within development 
and achieve social good. Simultaneously, the Foundation began its work to build the 
impact investing sector based on the premise that the resources of government and 
philanthropy alone are insufficient to address the world’s biggest problems.
Social Impact Bonds— “or Pay for Success Bonds”—sit at the nexus of our work in 
impact investing and scaling innovation, and represent one component of the rapidly 
growing field of innovative finance that the Foundation has long supported and will 
continue to support as it evolves and changes in the future. 
Social Impact Bonds have the potential to substantially transform the social sector, 
support poor and vulnerable communities, and create new financial flows for 
human service delivery by offering an innovative way to scale what works and break 
the cyclical need for crisis-driven services. They are an exciting field of innovative 
finance, but one we need to approach thoughtfully. This publication offers a 
framework for both the promise and challenges of Social Impact Bonds as state and 
local governments within the US begin to explore this new innovation.
The Rockefeller Foundation has been proud to support the growth of Social Impact 
Bonds from the very beginning, as a funder for Social Finance UK and as an investor 
in the Social Impact Bond pilot in Peterborough, UK. The Rockefeller Foundation is 
committed to testing the effectiveness and scalability of this model, and we pride 
ourselves on using our risk capital in service of innovation.
The Foundation sees great opportunity for Social Impact Bonds in the United States 
and is proud to have both commissioned this report from Social Finance US as well as 
providing support for Social Finance US’s continued work to assess the scalability of 
Social Impact Bonds in America.
We hope that this publication and the ongoing work of Social Finance US serve as an 
important step to advance the field of innovative finance.
Judith Rodin
President, The Rockefeller Foundation
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In September 2010, our sister organization, Social Finance, Ltd., launched the  
world’s first Social Impact Bond in the United Kingdom. Targeted at reducing prison 
recidivism, the Peterborough pilot generated world-wide interest in the potential of 
this innovative financial instrument. We established Social Finance, Inc. in January 
2011, to bring the Social Impact Bond to the United States. Since our founding, we have 
been collaborating with government, investors, nonprofit organizations, and thought 
leaders on how Social Impact Bonds might realign incentives for delivering social  
outcomes and augment public funding and philanthropy to support our collective  
efforts to improve the lives of individuals and communities in need. 
At its core, the Social Impact Bond is about partnership. We are grateful to the  
Rockefeller Foundation and our other founding partners who share our commitment 
to mobilizing investment capital to drive social change. The momentum that Social 
Impact Bonds have brought to the larger impact investing industry has been inspiring; 
yet there is much work to be done. Successful collaboration with a broad range of  
constituents, thoughtful design of an innovative and complex instrument, and  
diligent execution of transactions will be critical to realizing the promise of Social 
Impact Bonds.
Most recently, we have witnessed an important milestone in this nascent industry’s 
efforts. In May 2011, Massachusetts became the first state in the country to take formal 
steps to create a comprehensive social innovation financing program to deploy Social 
Impact Bonds and pay-for-success contracts. In January 2012, Massachusetts issued 
Requests for Response for performance-based financing to expand support for  
chronically homeless adults and youth exiting the juvenile justice system. The  
Commonwealth’s pioneering efforts stand to validate the potential of Social Impact 
Bonds: to improve social outcomes at reduced taxpayer expense, transfer performance 
risk from government to investors who might be more able to price and bear it, and 
reward high-performing nonprofits with long-term growth capital to scale proven 
innovations.
The purpose of this publication is to provide an overview for a broad audience of both 
the promise and challenges of developing and implementing Social Impact Bonds in 
the United States. Despite the many complexities, multi-stakeholder interactions, and 
varying dimensions of risks, Social Impact Bonds represent a potentially valuable new 
tool for scaling social impact.
tRacy palandJian
CEO, Social Finance, Inc.
ForEword By TrACy PAlANdJIAN 
ceo, social Finance, Inc.
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Executive Summary
The United States is home to almost a million charitable organizations that 
provide vital services to vulnerable individuals and communities. Though 
they are bringing innovation to bear on intractable social problems, these 
organizations collectively serve only a small fraction of those in need. 
Limited funding—especially the lack of long-term funding—constrains  
nonprofits’ growth and contributes to a high degree of fragmentation within 
the social sector. Even nonprofits with the strongest track records are unable 
to significantly expand their services and benefit a wider portion of the 
population. 
Today nonprofits have a new source of capital to scale evidence-based 
interventions: Social Impact Bonds (SIBs).1 Aligning the interests of nonprofit 
service providers, private investors, and governments, SIBs raise private 
investment capital to fund prevention and early intervention programs 
that reduce the need for expensive crisis responses and safety-net services. 
The government repays investors only if the interventions improve social 
outcomes, such as reducing homelessness or the number of repeat  
offenders in the criminal justice system. If improved outcomes are not 
u
1 Social Impact Bonds are also referred to as Pay-for-Success Bonds. Though they are called bonds, SIBs 
have both equity- and debt-like features.
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achieved, the government is not required to repay the investors, thereby 
transferring the risk of funding prevention services to the private sector and 
ensuring accountability for taxpayer money.
While SIBs are not a panacea, they might provide a unique way to make 
effective interventions available to far more people in need than the number 
that can be reached through traditional state contracts and philanthropy. The 
best candidates for SIB funding are nonprofits with strong track records of 
improving outcomes for a well-defined target population. These outcomes 
translate into government savings that can be achieved within a relatively 
short time frame and are large enough to cover the program’s cost and a 
reasonable return to investors. 
Dedicated intermediaries will be critical to the success of SIBs. Intermediaries 
can add value during each step of SIB development and implementation, 
including originating the deal, securing a government contract, structuring 
the instrument, and issuing the SIB. They attract investment capital, for 
instance, by creating and facilitating access to tools that allow investors to 
analyze, measure, and price the risk of the investment. Throughout the five- 
to ten-year life of the instrument, intermediaries play an especially important 
role in managing complex projects, mitigating risks, and helping service 
providers achieve targeted outcomes. 
The Social Impact Bond is a promising new product within the impact  
investing sector, with potential to become a multi-billion dollar source of 
growth capital to fund effective social programs. Although the instrument 
is still in its infancy, interest in SIBs is steadily growing, with governments 
from the United States to Australia exploring the concept. Conducting 
pilots across different social issue areas and geographies will be essential in 
broadening understanding of how Social Impact Bonds can be implemented 
most effectively. 
tHe socIal IMPact Bond Is a PRoMIsIng neW 
PRoduct WItHIn tHe IMPact InvestIng  
sectoR, WItH PotentIal to BecoMe a  
MultI-BIllIon dollaR souRce oF gRoWtH 
caPItal to Fund eFFectIve socIal PRogRaMs.
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Market Context 
Over the past few decades, many innovative programs have demonstrated 
success in their efforts to better the lives of our nation’s most at-risk and 
vulnerable populations. Regrettably, these initiatives tend to remain small, 
collectively serving only a fraction of those who could benefit. Philanthropy 
has played a leading role in funding these innovations, supporting nonprofits 
as they tested, refined, and perfected their models. However, there is now a 
profound need for nonprofit growth capital—funding that is longer, larger, 
and more flexible—so that these interventions can be offered to many more 
people in need.
A major barrier to the growth of nonprofits lies in the nature of funding for 
the social sector. Traditionally, nonprofit programs and social services have 
been supported by government and philanthropy. While both are essential 
funding streams, they have been unable to meet the overwhelming need. 
Limited funds are spread thinly across a fragmented nonprofit landscape. 
Commitments tend to be of limited duration and too small to achieve scale. 
Furthermore, targeting funding to the most effective programs has proved 
challenging, as the social sector lacks sufficient measurement of participants’ 
outcomes. As a result, nonprofits spend significant amounts of time raising 
short-term money and are constrained in their ability to develop longer-term 
strategies.
u
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Meanwhile, governments at all levels are struggling in the face of large 
deficits that reflect not only the lingering effects of the financial crisis, but 
also long-term structural gaps (with spending growing faster than revenues). 
As a result, governments are trapped in a vicious cycle: Limited resources for 
prevention programs, such as supportive housing and job training, leads to 
greater demand for safety-net services, such as shelters and prisons, followed 
by further reductions in early intervention programs that could reduce the 
need for remediation in the future. 
Obstacles remain in the way of expanding effective nonprofit programs, 
but recent developments suggest there may be reason for optimism. Impact 
investing—actively investing capital to generate financial returns and social 
or environmental impact—has drawn substantial interest over the past  
few years. With the potential to spark significant progress, this approach 
could bring a large new pool of capital to bear on social problems. Unlike 
public-sector or grant funding, impact investments produce financial returns 
that can be reinvested in the social sector. In this way, capital can be recycled 
and returns can be used again to continue widening impact. 
The confluence of these factors—the need for nonprofit growth capital, 
shrinking government budgets, and the growth of impact investing—has 
paved the way for the development of an innovative financial instrument: the 
Social Impact Bond. 
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The Promise and Challenges of Social Impact Bonds
The Social Impact Bond is designed to accelerate the expansion of evidence-
based programs delivered by effective nonprofits. The world’s first SIB was 
launched in the U.K. by Social Finance, Ltd. in September 2010 (see page 9, “The 
World’s First Social Impact Bond”). Since then, governments around the world 
have expressed interest in launching SIBs of their own. Australia released a 
Request for Proposals on SIBs (which they refer to as “Social Benefit Bonds”) 
in September 2011. Governments and nonprofits in other countries, including 
Canada and Ireland, are actively exploring the concept as well. In the United 
States, President Obama proposed funding of $100 million for SIBs in his FY2012 
budget, and Massachusetts became the first state to formally indicate its interest 
when it released a Request for Information on the instrument in May 2011. In 
January 2012, Massachusetts deepened its commitment to social innovation 
financing and the development of SIB contracts by issuing Requests for Response. 
Specifically, the Commonwealth asked intermediaries and nonprofits how SIBs 
might be used to provide stable housing for chronically homeless individuals  
and support youth exiting juvenile corrections and probation systems. 
u
FolloWIng Ben FRanKlIn’s MaxIM tHat “an 
ounce oF PReventIon Is WoRtH a Pound oF 
cuRe,” sIBs Fund eFFectIve PRogRaMs tHat 
tacKle tHe Root causes oF HoMelessness, 
cRIMe, and otHeR dIsaBlIng econoMIc and 
socIal condItIons. 
Q
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ThE world’S FIrST SoCIAl IMPACT BoNd
social Finance (u.K.) launched the world’s first sIB in september 2010. 
the u.K.-based organization raised £5 million (~us$8 million) from 17 
investors to fund a comprehensive reentry program (the one*service) 
for short-sentenced prisoners leaving Peterborough prison over 
a six-year period. Prisoners serving sentences of less than a year 
typically receive little support upon release; they often leave with just 
£46 (~us$70) in their pocket and no housing, job, or family support. 
consequently, over 60 percent become repeat offenders within one 
year. the sIB contracts organizations, including the st giles trust, 
ormiston children and Families trust, the YMca, and sova, to provide 
tailored wrap-around services to 3,000 prisoners before and after their 
release to facilitate successful reentry into the community.
For the most part, investors in the Peterborough sIB represent 
philanthropic sources of capital, including the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the Barrow cadbury charitable trust, and the esmée Fairbairn 
Foundation. the Ministry of Justice and the Big lottery Fund have 
agreed to repay these investors if one-year post-release reconvictions 
decrease by at least 7.5 percent, relative to a comparison group. 
Because sIB performance is measured by the number of times 
ex-offenders are reconvicted, and not simply whether or not they 
reoffend, providers are encouraged to work with all prisoners leaving 
Peterborough, including the most prolific reoffenders. the sIB has an 
eight-year term, with capital drawdowns made annually in years one 
through six. Payments to investors, if they become due, occur  
in approximately years four, six, and eight. Returns are commensurate 
with social outcomes and will range between 2.5 percent and 13 percent.
Q
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how SoCIAl IMPACT BoNdS work 
Social Impact Bonds align the interests of nonprofit service providers, 
investors, and governments in an effort to improve the lives of individuals 
and communities in need. Their core feature is the provision of funding 
for upstream prevention or early intervention programs that significantly 
reduce the need for subsequent and more costly remediation. Following Ben 
Franklin’s maxim that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure,” SIBs 
fund effective programs that tackle the root causes of homelessness, crime, 
and other disabling economic and social conditions. 
Governments spend billions of taxpayer dollars each year on crisis-driven 
services. These programs help a great number of people, but fail to make 
much headway in solving social problems that have become too complex 
for one dimensional, prescriptive solutions. Although they recognize 
the economic and social benefits of prevention, government agencies 
generally cannot afford early intervention services as their funds are 
already committed to high-cost remediation programs. Indeed, even if they 
fund prevention, governments risk having to pay for both prevention and 
remediation if their chosen prevention programs fail to improve participants’ 
outcomes. The short-term imperatives of the election cycle exacerbate 
this tendency to shy away from potentially risky, longer-term preventative 
investments. 
Agencies also tend to work in silos, a structure that discourages collaboration 
on cross-cutting issues. For instance, homeless individuals impose significant 
costs on health and corrections agencies, yet solutions to homelessness are 
implemented by housing agencies. Because the costs of remediation and 
prevention are divided among departments, agencies often lack the incentive 
to collaboratively develop and deliver effective, integrated solutions at scale.
SIBs would address these problems by allowing governments to transfer 
the financial risk of prevention programs to private investors based on the 
expectation of future recoverable savings. They also provide the incentive 
for multiple government agencies to work together, capturing savings across 
agencies to fund investor repayment. 
altHougH tHeY RecognIze tHe econoMIc  
and socIal BeneFIts oF PReventIon, 
goveRnMent agencIes geneRallY cannot 
aFFoRd eaRlY InteRventIon seRvIces as tHeIR 
Funds aRe alReadY coMMItted to HIgH-cost 
ReMedIatIon PRogRaMs.
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The power of SIBs lies in their ability to align all stakeholders’ interests 
around achieving common objectives for the benefit of poor and vulnerable 
populations. Stakeholders in SIBs—nonprofits, investors, government, and 
communities—would all benefit from successful SIB programs (see table 1). 
High-performing nonprofit service providers would have unprecedented 
access to growth capital to expand their operations. This stable and predictable 
revenue stream would allow them to spend less time fundraising and more 
time focusing on their core competencies: serving vulnerable populations 
in need. Nonprofits would also benefit from increased coordination among 
organizations working on similar issues, raising their effectiveness. Investors 
would put capital to work that achieves both meaningful social impact and 
financial returns. They would also have the opportunity to participate in a 
new asset class with the benefits of portfolio diversification. Government 
would attain accountability for taxpayer funds and better results for its 
citizens at lower public expense, even after paying an appropriate financial 
return to investors. Most importantly, breaking the cycle of reliance on 
crisis-driven interventions, wider availability of effective prevention services 
would benefit vulnerable individuals, families, and communities.
taBle 1  BENEFITS To STAkEholdErS oF SuCCESSFul SIBs
STAkEholdErS
Nonprofits
Investors
Government
Communities
u	access to growth capital to scale up operations
u	access to a stable and predictable revenue stream  
 without labor-intensive fundraising
u	Facilitated coordination with organizations working  
 on overlapping problems
u	achievement of financial returns and social impact
u	Participation in a new asset class with portfolio  
 diversification benefits
u	accountability for taxpayer funds 
u	Reduction in the need for costly downstream remediation
u	Increased supply of effective services for citizens  
 without financial risk
u	access to an increased supply of effective social services
u	Reduction in the need for crisis-driven interventions
BENEFITS
12 SoCIAl FINANCE, INC.
Launching a Social Impact Bond requires a significant effort up front to 
identify and vet potential programs and then negotiate a contract in which 
the government agrees to repay investors if the selected nonprofit service 
providers achieve specified social outcomes. A dedicated SIB intermediary 
can play a valuable role in these initial stages. After a contract is secured, SIBs 
would work as follows (see figure 1):
1 an intermediary issues the sIB and raises capital from private investors. 
2 the intermediary transfers the sIB proceeds to nonprofit service providers, 
 which use the funds as working capital to scale evidence-based prevention 
 programs. throughout the life of the instrument, the intermediary would 
 coordinate all sIB parties, provide operating oversight, direct cash flows,  
 and monitor the investment.
3 By providing effective prevention programs, the nonprofits improve 
 social outcomes and reduce demand for more expensive safety-net services. 
4 an independent evaluator determines whether the target outcomes have 
 been achieved according to the terms of the government contract. If they have, 
 the government pays the intermediary a percentage of its savings and retains 
 the rest. If outcomes have not been achieved, the government owes nothing. 
5  If the outcomes have been achieved, investors would be repaid their principal and 
 a rate of return. Returns may be structured on a sliding scale: the better the 
 outcomes, the higher the return (up to an agreed cap). 
2 Adapted from Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds,” Center for American Progress (February 2011).
INvESTorS
GovErNMENT
FIguRe 1  SoCIAl IMPACT BoNd MEChANICS 2
NoNProFITS
l1
u
INTErMEdIAry
Make long-term investment
l5
Repay principal + RoI
u
u
u
u
l3
Produce improved outcomes that reduce 
demand for safety-net services
l4
Pay only for programs  
that work; retain  
% of savings
l2
Fund & oversee less costly,  
evidence-based 
prevention programs
u
Investor risk
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2 Adapted from Jeffrey B. Liebman, “Social Impact Bonds,” Center for American Progress (February 2011).
Pay only for programs  
that work; retain  
% of savings
u
After the SIB term is complete, the government potentially has two options 
to extend the program. Theoretically, it could fund the program directly, or 
it could execute another SIB to fund the program for five to ten more years. 
Given the considerable value added by the intermediary and the market 
discipline that investors contribute, SIBs would be an effective way to 
recapitalize successful programs.
It is important to note that SIBs are intended to complement government 
funding, and must not be used to displace or replace it. SIBs support proven 
programs that the government is not currently funding at all or at scale, 
either due to budget constraints or an unwillingness to assume the financial 
risk if prevention fails. To expand programs that are already in place, SIBs 
should supplement existing public funds, transferring the financial risk  
of program expansion to investors who are prepared to analyze and accept 
that risk.
InnovatIve FeatuRes 
SIBs differ substantially from traditional vendor contracts and even from 
performance-based contracts for social services. Most governments pay for 
social services with insufficient consideration to how effective the programs 
actually are in achieving better outcomes for the target population. To a 
limited extent, some governments use performance-based contracts that offer 
reimbursement or financial incentives and penalties for performance above or 
below defined thresholds. Yet, these contracts usually require that nonprofits 
raise their own working capital, with payment from the government occurring 
only after certain targets have been achieved. But very few nonprofits 
have the ability to fund, let alone scale, their operations in this way. Also, 
reimbursement tends to be measured by outputs, rather than outcomes. 
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These contracts often reward nonprofits based on the number of people 
who have completed a substance-abuse recovery program, for example, 
rather than the number who remain sober for an extended period of time or 
reductions in drug-related crime. SIBs are unique in their up-front provision 
of working capital to nonprofits and their emphasis on social outcomes.
Despite their name, Social Impact Bonds differ from municipal bonds and 
other fixed-income instruments that are often used for infrastructure or other 
capital projects. SIBs share features of both debt and equity. The instrument 
has a fixed term of between five and ten years, and the upside is capped, 
but, like equity, returns vary based on performance. Compared to a typical 
debt instrument, investors bear a higher risk of losing all of their principal. 
Moreover, these investments are not backed by hard assets or cash flows. 
To manage the associated risks, an intermediary will engage in project 
management over the life of the instrument, much like an active asset 
manager, to ensure that long-term outcomes and the collective objectives of 
all the parties are achieved.
The SIB structure described above, which might be termed SIB 1.0, is flexible 
and can change over time (see page 15, “Beyond SIB 1.0”). While SIB pilots 
will likely focus on programs with near-term cost savings, it is possible 
that SIBs could finance programs that do not necessarily lead to savings 
or that offer longer-term or more diffuse savings. For instance, preschool 
programs for low-income children have been shown to be very effective, 
but their outcomes are manifest years later in the form of better high school 
graduation rates, improved health outcomes as adults, and lower crime rates. 
Government could agree to participate in SIBs for such public-sector priorities, 
despite a lack of sufficient levels of immediate savings to cover program costs. 
Alternatively, in lieu of government, corporations and foundations could 
participate as payors. Where corporations (such as health insurers) benefit 
from SIB programs, they may see an incentive to agree to pay investors if 
to Manage tHe assocIated RIsKs, an 
InteRMedIaRY WIll engage In PRoJect 
ManageMent oveR tHe lIFe oF tHe InstRuMent, 
MucH lIKe an actIve asset ManageR, to ensuRe 
tHat long-teRM outcoMes and tHe collectIve 
oBJectIves oF all tHe PaRtIes aRe acHIeved.
Q
A New Tool for Scaling Impact 15
to Manage tHe assocIated RIsKs, an 
InteRMedIaRY WIll engage In PRoJect 
ManageMent oveR tHe lIFe oF tHe InstRuMent, 
MucH lIKe an actIve asset ManageR, to ensuRe 
tHat long-teRM outcoMes and tHe collectIve 
oBJectIves oF all tHe PaRtIes aRe acHIeved.
BEyoNd SIB 1.0
the first social Impact Bonds will likely follow a similar structure: 
philanthropically minded investors providing working capital for 
nonprofit interventions that generate near-term cost savings the 
government can share with investors. over time, the sIB structure is 
likely to vary and become more flexible. specifically, variation may 
occur in four areas:
Payor: a foundation or corporation, or a group of either, could agree 
to pay for outcomes. Foundations may be interested in participating as 
payor where the government is unlikely to commit. For instance, there 
are interventions that generate positive outcomes, but their associated 
cost savings do not cover the cost of the intervention or occur too 
far in the future to repay investors in the near term. alternatively, 
corporations may agree to pay for outcomes if an intervention is 
beneficial to them. Health insurers, for instance, may find it attractive 
to participate in an sIB that reduces health claims for a certain 
population.
Investors: While early interest in sIB investment is likely to come 
from foundations, charitable trusts, high net-worth individuals, and 
family offices, institutional and other market-rate investors may find 
sIBs to be an attractive investment opportunity as the instrument 
gains a track record. as the sIB model is proven and tested in various 
geographies and diverse issue areas, investors should gain confidence 
in the instrument’s viability. It is possible, however, that mainstream 
investors may participate earlier if sIBs are structured in such a way as 
to decrease the investment’s downside risk.
Social enterprises: While attention now is on nonprofits that generate 
social value and near-term government savings, for-profit social 
enterprises could become sIB candidates as well. as noted above, 
interventions that do not produce quantifiable near-term savings may 
also be considered.
Investment structure: In addition to these variations, sIBs will likely 
move from a deal-by-deal approach to a portfolio approach, allowing 
investors to diversify their risk by investing in a basket of sIB-funded 
interventions.
Q
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outcomes (such as smoking cessation) are achieved. Foundations could act as 
payor via performance-based grants on projects that have large societal value, 
but that produce outcomes that are hard to measure or do not create public-
sector savings. The types of SIB investors, the enterprises that are funded, and 
the structure of the investment are also flexible and subject to variation.
kEy PlAyErS 
Due to the complex nature of the problems Social Impact Bonds are designed 
to address, the number of partners involved, and the long duration of the 
projects they fund, the underlying contractual agreements must support 
and align the interests of all parties. The key players—nonprofits, investors, 
government, intermediaries, and evaluators—must reach agreement at 
the outset and maintain consensus over the life of the instrument. During 
the SIB, they must engage in coordinated activities in order to achieve 
the strategic objective of producing greater social impact and reducing 
public-sector cost. The identification and selection of qualified parties, the 
allocation of responsibilities among them, and the synchronization of their 
work are critical success factors.
Although complex, the SIB partnership establishes a system of checks and 
balances that prevents any single party’s self-interest from undermining 
the pursuit of shared objectives. The bar is kept high for the targeted social 
outcomes, providing nonprofits with the incentive to deliver quality services. 
Government only pays investors for real value creation, encouraging investors 
to conduct due diligence and follow the investment closely, contributing 
to the achievement of a successful SIB program. This interdependence 
promotes productive collaboration, encouraging the parties to focus on real 
long-term progress.
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The characteristics of each player and how they interact are described below.
nonPRoFIts 
SIBs should not be seen as a panacea for every nonprofit’s funding challenges. 
They are a tool that can work for a certain subset of nonprofits. Since SIBs are 
best suited to scaling what works, the ideal candidates for SIB funding are 
nonprofits with programs that have been shown to be effective. Investors will 
only participate if they have confidence in the nonprofit’s ability to deliver 
the agreed outcomes. These outcomes, in turn, must translate into  
government savings that can be achieved within a relatively short time frame 
and are large enough to cover the program’s cost and a reasonable return to 
investors. The program must serve a well-defined treatment population that can 
be tracked and whose outcomes can be measured against a counterfactual 
over the life of the SIB. Finally, these nonprofits must have the capacity 
to use growth capital effectively to scale up their programs. Selection of 
the SIB intervention and nonprofit providers should also involve careful 
consideration of the target population, and contingency plans should be 
made to protect vulnerable individuals if the SIB programs fail. One SIB 
can fund a single nonprofit or several service providers working toward a 
common goal.
InvestoRs 
Investors impose market discipline on the partnership. They help drive  
organizational efficiency by requiring that their financial return be  
determined through a clear measurement methodology. Since the financial 
risk is transferred to the investors, they must have sufficient information to 
price the risk they are undertaking. In order to commit their capital, investors 
need robust investment propositions in which risks, as well as financial and 
social returns, are properly articulated and managed. They will require tools, 
such as a credit scorecard, that reflect an intermediary’s methodical and 
careful vetting of interventions and rigorous assessment of nonprofit service 
providers’ ability to scale up their operations.  
In oRdeR to coMMIt tHeIR caPItal,  
InvestoRs need RoBust InvestMent 
PRoPosItIons In WHIcH RIsKs, as Well as 
FInancIal and socIal RetuRns, aRe  
PRoPeRlY aRtIculated and Managed.
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Robust intermediaries will give investors confidence that the SIB-funded 
program will be well executed, performance will be tracked regularly, and 
outcomes will be determined fairly and reliably. Enduring intermediaries 
will be dedicated over the life of the SIB to mitigate any risks that could affect 
investor repayment. For instance, the intermediary will reduce the political 
risk that the government fails to appropriate funds to pay investors by 
working to secure authorization of a multi-year contract. 
With an informed understanding of the risk involved in the financing, 
investors can then evaluate whether to invest. SIBs can be structured to 
attract investors with a wide range of risk appetites, including foundations 
and the charitable trusts of high-net-worth individuals, as well as 
institutional investors. A range of structures may be deployed to allow 
investors to choose the most appropriate risk-return profile. 
For example, a structure with senior and subordinated tranches could attract 
mainstream as well as philanthropic investors. A senior tranche could offer 
low-risk and fixed returns to institutional investors, while a subordinated 
tranche funded by philanthropic investors would function as a first-loss 
reserve. Various credit enhancement techniques may be applied in a  
single-tranche SIB or in combination with the tranche structure to lower 
the risk profile of the senior tranche. For example, a minimum amount of 
guaranteed cash flow, an insurance “wrap” of some or all of the principal 
payments, or a reserve fund could be offered. All of these would serve to yield 
greater investor participation and reduce the cost of the overall financing. 
goveRnMent  
SIBs require government champions who are committed to effective 
preventive interventions and collaboration with nonprofits. While SIBs 
appear to lend themselves to state-level projects (since states assume much 
of the burden for safety-net spending), they can also work at the local and 
federal levels. SIBs should have bipartisan appeal as they shift financial risk 
to private investors, impose market discipline, and encourage cross-sector 
collaboration as well as the efficient use of government funds. 
sIBs sHould Have BIPaRtIsan aPPeal as tHeY 
sHIFt FInancIal RIsK to PRIvate InvestoRs, 
IMPose MaRKet dIscIPlIne, and encouRage 
cRoss-sectoR collaBoRatIon as Well as tHe 
eFFIcIent use oF goveRnMent Funds. 
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Governments play a key role in the design and structure of the procurement 
process for an SIB contract (see page 25, “Government Contracting for Social 
Impact Bonds”).
InteRMedIaRIes 
Dedicated intermediaries play a vital role in developing and launching SIBs, 
as well as managing the ongoing public-private-nonprofit partnership over 
the life of the instrument. SIB intermediaries can address stumbling blocks 
encountered during the program, ensuring its successful implementation. 
In order to keep the project on track, an intermediary might add or replace 
resources to strengthen an intervention that is not working as expected. 
The intermediary needs to have a collaborative relationship with evaluators 
to understand interim results as well as with providers to jointly identify 
and address problems as they arise. For further discussion on the role of the 
intermediary, see “Risk Mitigation through Intermediation,” later in this 
document.
evaluatoRs 
SIBs require two types of evaluation: a “strategic” or “developmental” approach 
that provides ongoing feedback on interim performance throughout the 
lifetime of the SIB as well as a second “summative” approach that provides an 
audit of whether the pre-defined outcomes have been ultimately achieved. 
Only the latter must serve an independent auditing function, although the 
former would benefit from third-party expertise.
Randomized-controlled trials are too expensive, cumbersome, and often 
logistically infeasible for the second type of SIB evaluation, but quasi-
experimental evaluation designs (in which the treatment group can be 
compared against a matched comparison group) should be practicable. 
Special care should be taken to design an evaluation that avoids creating 
perverse incentives, such as serving the easiest or most motivated clients 
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(“cream-skimming”), and other unintended consequences. For instance, the 
U.K. SIB tracks all ex-offenders leaving Peterborough prison, not just those 
who elect to participate in the reentry program. Outcome measurements are 
reflective of the wider population, rather than of just those who may be more 
motivated to seek these services. In addition, to the greatest extent possible, 
both evaluation processes should be geared to support rather than burden 
nonprofit operations. 
SIB evaluation requires a robust data collection system to track program 
participants and their outcomes over time. While effective nonprofits may 
have their own data systems, it is advisable that an SIB intermediary, with an 
evaluator, perform due diligence up front to assess any gaps and weaknesses 
in data-collection protocols. Collaboration with relevant government agencies 
will also be necessary to gain access to administrative data, such as Medicaid 
records. Administrative data will allow evaluators to assess program 
participants’ outcomes relative to a comparison group or a historical baseline. 
Where programs affect multiple government agencies, integrated data systems 
would be extremely beneficial. For instance, youth aging out of foster care 
can affect the criminal justice, health, housing, and welfare systems. A data 
system that tabulates costs and savings across these agencies would facilitate 
the measurement of outcomes.
PoTENTIAl rISkS 
The Social Impact Bond model is not without its risks. A multi-party,  
cross-sector initiative introduces complexities that traditional  
government-vendor contracts do not entail. SIBs present risks that may 
include, but are not limited to, intervention model, execution, intermediary,  
political, financial, and reputational risks.
InteRventIon Model RIsK 
If the selected intervention is not carefully vetted, it may fail to produce 
the expected social outcomes. The due diligence process should provide an 
understanding of the intervention model, project cash flows, and the  
capacity of the nonprofit providers. This step is critical to an SIB’s success.
 
staKeHoldeRs Must MaKe PRovIsIons to 
ensuRe tHat no HaRM coMes to tHe taRget 
BeneFIcIaRIes IF tHe PRoJect Funded BY tHe 
sIB oR tHe sIB ItselF does not succeed.
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executIon RIsK 
SIBs face not only the usual performance challenges that any project-based 
financing entails, but also ones that arise from the unique vulnerabilities 
inherent in its operating model. Problems can occur if there are unclear 
lines of authority, poor communication among multiple participants, lack 
of follow-through by one or more partners, or failure to capture timely and 
reliable data on progress. In addition, SIBs impose significant managerial, 
performance, and measurement burdens on nonprofit organizations. SIBs 
may encounter problems if nonprofits lack sufficient capacity to manage 
these responsibilities when scaling their programs. Stakeholders must make 
provisions to ensure that no harm comes to the target beneficiaries if the 
project funded by the SIB or the SIB itself does not succeed.
InteRMedIaRY RIsK 
Intermediaries must be enduring to add value to SIBs from deal origination 
through investor repayment. They are required to raise the capital, 
administer its deployment, and price and manage the risks inherent in 
an SIB proposition. Intermediaries that fail to commit to SIBs over the 
long term, either due to changing internal priorities or weak financials or 
governance, expose SIBs to greater risk. Ideally, intermediaries will have 
multi-disciplinary knowledge across the financial, governmental, and 
social sectors, and strong working relationships with evaluation firms and 
subject-matter experts. Intermediaries lacking this background and these 
relationships contribute greater risk to a successful SIB.
PolItIcal RIsK 
It is possible that the government could fail to repay investors even when  
the pre-defined outcomes are achieved. In recognition of this possibility, 
investors will require a secure obligation from government to pay  
agreed-upon returns under unambiguous terms and conditions. Ideally, SIB 
repayments should not be subject to the political uncertainty inherent in 
the annual appropriations process. Investors would be reluctant to commit 
capital for five or more years if the government can only guarantee funding 
for one year at a time. Government credit risk, the risk that even with these 
arrangements governments will fail to meet their obligations to investors, 
should also be considered.
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FInancIal RIsK 
As described above, investors bear 100 percent of the financial risk in an 
SIB. This instrument allows government to only pay for those programs that 
are successful. Unlike some pay-for-performance contracts, nonprofits are 
provided with up-front funding over the duration of the SIB. SIBs signify a 
new paradigm of public-private partnerships in the wake of the financial 
crisis, one that privatizes the risks and shares the gains. Risk-mitigation 
methods (such as first-loss provisions, reserve funds, or other credit-
enhancement products) could be incorporated into the SIB structure to allow 
the SIB to appeal to a wide range of investors.
RePutatIonal RIsK 
If an SIB-funded intervention is unsuccessful, the nonprofits carrying out the 
program may suffer significant reputational harm. Their failure to achieve 
target social outcomes will likely affect donors’ decisions about funding 
these organizations in the future. Similarly, if the government fails to repay 
investors despite the achievement of agreed-upon targets, it too can suffer 
damage to its reputation and its credit rating.
rISk MITIGATIoN ThrouGh INTErMEdIATIoN 
Dedicated intermediaries play an essential risk-management role in the 
Social Impact Bond model. Vertically integrated third-party intermediaries 
that are actively involved throughout the entire SIB value chain—from deal 
origination through investor repayment—are likely best suited to ensuring 
successful outcomes. 
sIBs sIgnIFY a neW PaRadIgM oF PuBlIc-
PRIvate PaRtneRsHIPs In tHe WaKe oF tHe 
FInancIal cRIsIs, one tHat PRIvatIzes tHe 
RIsKs and sHaRes tHe gaIns.
FIguRe 2  vErTICAlly INTEGrATEd INTErMEdIATIoN ModEl
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Intermediaries could be involved in the following phases of SIB development 
and implementation (see figure 2):
oRIgInate deal 
Intermediaries identify social issue areas with savings opportunities in 
which there appear to be significant net benefits that could be realized over 
a reasonable time horizon. They meet with government officials to learn of 
their priority issues and find areas of mutual interest. Intermediaries identify 
and conduct careful due diligence regarding potential nonprofit providers. 
They also conduct financial modeling to assess the viability of each SIB 
application. Through these activities, the intermediary reduces intervention 
model risk.
secuRe goveRnMent contRact 
Unlike traditional government contracts in which taxpayers directly 
fund operations, SIB contracts require more collaborative approaches to 
develop an arrangement that promotes long-term outcomes. The process of 
contracting for an SIB can take different forms. Whether it is a competitive 
procurement process or direct negotiation between an intermediary and 
government agency, it will be imperative for SIB contracts to carefully lay 
out the parties’ shared expectations about the objectives and the means 
of achieving them (see page 25, “Government Contracting for Social 
Impact Bonds”). Once a contract is in place, or as it nears its final form, 
the parties must work together to secure legislative authorization of the 
contract supporting the SIB in order to provide investors with confidence in 
repayment and lessen the political risk.
FIguRe 2  vErTICAlly INTEGrATEd INTErMEdIATIoN ModEl
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stRuctuRe InstRuMent 
Once awarded a government contract, dedicated intermediaries finalize the 
cash flow model, data requirements, evaluation strategy, and operating plan. 
They also structure investor term sheets, reflecting an understanding of 
the needs of different investors. As mentioned earlier, credit enhancement 
strategies and different capital structures could be undertaken to encourage 
the participation of additional types of investors.
RaIse caPItal 
Intermediaries recruit interested investors, raise the investment capital, and 
issue the bonds. Once an SIB is launched, intermediaries call capital and 
disburse payments to service providers. They also serve an investor-relations 
role by monitoring the financial and social metrics of SIBs and ensuring that 
investors receive regular investor communications on program performance. 
Manage PRoJect oveR InstRuMent’s lIFe 
Perhaps an intermediary’s most important long-term role is overseeing the 
SIB-funded program from inception through final investor repayment. This 
project-management role is essential to the success of the SIB. Intermediaries 
help nonprofits absorb and deploy SIB proceeds to maximize impact. They 
also facilitate nonprofits’ coordination with government partners, the 
community, and other service providers, promoting collaboration within the 
social sector. By making mid-course corrections and filling resource gaps 
as necessary, intermediaries mitigate execution risk and enable nonprofits 
to focus their time and resources on their core competencies. In addition, 
they see to it that evaluation efforts run smoothly and inform program 
progress along the way. Knowing that an intermediary will be looking out for 
hurdles and helping to address them should provide investors with greater 
confidence in SIBs. 
Q
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GovErNMENT CoNTrACTING For SoCIAl IMPACT BoNdS
If states choose to pursue competitive solicitations during this early 
stage of sIB development, procuring and developing sIB contracts will 
be challenging for two reasons. First, no one in the u.s.—government 
agency, intermediary, nonprofit, or investor—has ever executed 
such an agreement. they would differ from traditional government-
vendor contracts or even contracts with financial incentives and 
penalties. second, at this nascent stage of the market, only a very few 
organizations are qualified to serve as sIB intermediaries, particularly 
when it comes to raising investment capital and providing long-term 
project management.
state procurement laws establish a strong presumption in favor of 
competitive solicitations, based on two assumptions that might not 
be justified in the case of sIBs: that there are numerous qualified 
firms in the market and that standard contract terms and conditions 
can be prescribed in detail to establish a “level playing field” for all 
respondents. But sIB contracts involve an unusual number of unfamiliar 
moving parts. the world’s first sIB Request for Proposals, issued by the 
treasury department of new south Wales, australia, demonstrates this 
point. the document asks respondents to include information about 
the target population, location of the intervention, program referrals, 
evaluation, payment triggers, and cash flows in different performance 
scenarios, as well as numerous other details of the intervention and 
investment structure.
state procurement professionals and legal counsel may want to 
consider whether there are ways to structure solicitations with due 
regard for the small number of qualified intermediaries and the fact 
that initial contracts will be limited to demonstration projects. For 
example, the range of prospective responders could be identified 
through a Request for Qualifications that describes the extent to 
which the state wishes to engage either a specialized or full-service 
intermediary. alternatively, a more iterative process could be used  
to develop a flexible contract that leverages the capabilities of  
non-governmental organizations.
Q
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Promising Initial Social Impact Bond Applications
SIBs hold great promise in addressing a range of issue areas in various 
geographies. The following vulnerable populations could be served by  
SIB-funded interventions (see table 2):
u
taBle 2  PoTENTIAl SoCIAl IMPACT BoNd APPlICATIoNS
vulNErABlE  
PoPulATIoN
Chronically  
homeless  
Individuals
Juvenile and  
Adult offenders
low-income 
Seniors
Permanent 
supportive  
housing
community-based 
alternatives &  
reentry programs
aging-in-place via 
supportive housing
INTErvENTIoN 
ModEl
rETurN oN 
INvESTMENT
PoTENTIAl 
AGENCy SAvINGS
decreased use of 
acute medical care, 
shelter, & incarceration
avoided facilities 
expense & lower  
recidivism rates
Reduced nursing 
home stays
u	Medicaid 
u	corrections  
u	Housing
u	Youth services 
u	corrections,  
 Probation, & Parole
u	Medicaid 
u	Medicare
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ChroNICAlly hoMElESS INdIvIduAlS 
In 2011, there were approximately 110,000 chronically homeless individuals 
across the United States.3 Many of them have been on the streets for long 
stretches of time and have at least one disabling condition, such as a mental 
illness, substance addiction, or physical handicap. They impose substantial 
costs on public systems, as they make frequent use of emergency rooms, 
mental health and substance abuse facilities, jails, and shelters. Permanent 
supportive housing (PSH), which is affordable housing with access to services 
such as case management and behavioral health care, has been shown to 
be enormously effective with this population. PSH encourages residential 
stability, improves health and management of chronic illness, and decreases 
the use of safety-net services. (See page 28, “Example: A Social Impact 
Bond to End Homelessness” for an illustration of SIB economics for this 
intervention.)
JuvENIlE ANd AdulT oFFENdErS 
States spend more than $50 billion a year on corrections.4 The exploding 
cost of criminal justice has led some governments to shift funds away from 
education and other critical public investments just to keep offenders locked 
up. Meanwhile, detaining and incarcerating juvenile and adult offenders 
who do not pose clear public safety risks has no beneficial effect on either 
population, as evidenced by high recidivism rates across the country. In 
particular, juvenile detention can be highly detrimental to at-risk youth, 
as it disrupts their education, separates them from their families and 
communities, and exposes them to high-risk peers. Community-based 
alternatives to locked facilities, as well as adult reentry programs, show 
promise in lowering re-offending rates and facilitating better outcomes.
3 U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development, “2011 Point-in-Time (PIT) Estimates of Homelessness: 
Supplement to the Annual Homeless Assessment Report (AHAR)” (December 2011).
4 Pew Center on the States, “State of Recidivism: The Revolving Door of America’s Prisons”  
   (Washington, D.C.: The Pew Charitable Trusts, April 2011).
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example: a Social impact Bond to end HomeleSSneSS
To illustrate how SIBs work, consider a fictional SIB5 designed to 
address chronic homelessness. Chronically homeless individuals 
impose substantial costs on taxpayers as they cycle in and out of 
emergency rooms, jails, and shelters. Permanent supportive housing 
(PSH) has been shown to be enormously effective with this population, 
improving outcomes and greatly reducing costs to the public. This 
holistic strategy combines affordable housing with access to services 
such as case management and behavioral health care.
Before PSH is provided, assume that a state’s population of chronically 
homeless people imposes costs of $100 million. After PSH is made 
available, these costs go down substantially, but this population 
still needs health care and may actually access more outpatient, 
preventative care. Assume these costs are now $25 million. The SIB 
would raise $40 million to cover the cost of supportive housing (as 
well as non-programmatic SIB costs such as evaluation and project 
management). The government would then use a portion of its $35 
million in net savings ($100 million minus $25 million minus $40 
million) to fund investor returns, retaining the remainder.
Q
Status Quo
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5 The numbers used in this example are for illustrative purposes only and are not meant to represent  
   a specific SIB.
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6 U.S. Census Bureau, “Older Americans Month: May 2011,” Facts for Features (March 23, 2011).
low-INCoME SENIor CITIzENS 
Seniors are a growing demographic nationwide, now accounting for 13 
percent of the total U.S. population and projected to increase to 20 percent 
by 2050.6 As life expectancy grows, there will be greater numbers of seniors 
coping with frailty and reduced mobility. When they can no longer live 
independently, many seniors must enter costly nursing facilities, even if they 
need acute care only for a short time. Low-income seniors who move into 
these facilities and who are eligible for both Medicaid and Medicare impose 
significant costs on the government. Yet numerous alternative services can 
provide the extra care seniors need at much lower cost than nursing homes 
while allowing seniors to remain in their own homes or communities. Such 
“aging-in-place” interventions facilitate healthy outcomes while generating 
government savings.
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PETErBorouGh oNE yEAr oN
While it is too soon to tell whether the Peterborough social Impact 
Bond program, the one*service, has reduced reoffending enough to 
generate a return to investors, indications are encouraging. 
the one*service has made progress in finding housing, accessing 
health care, and increasing the income of prisoners leaving 
Peterborough prison, even those facing some of the most complex 
social challenges. While engagement with the one*service is 
purely voluntary, the proportion of prisoners it is working with is 
encouragingly high, indicating clear evidence of an unmet need.
clients are reporting better control of their lives and lower reoffending 
rates, a finding that has been corroborated by local police. Key to the 
one*service’s success is the flexibility inherent in its financing, which 
can be targeted as necessary to provide tailored services to clients. 
Real-time program assessment and adjustment have also been critical 
to ensuring that the one*service is meeting prisoners’ needs. the 
program providers, for instance, found that prisoners who initially 
refused support often ended up needing the one*service when their 
original plans fell through. 
so far, the Peterborough model has successfully replaced a  
one-size-fits-all approach with a targeted model to treat a vulnerable 
population. Whereas prior funding for reentry programs was piecemeal 
and short-term, the sIB provides long-term, flexible funding streams.  
It makes productive use of evaluation, which occurs far too infrequently 
in the social sector, and encourages coordination among local 
providers delivering complementary services, maximizing efforts around 
the achievement of shared objectives and positive social outcomes.
Q
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Conclusion
Social Impact Bonds offer an innovative way to scale what works. If they work 
as hoped, proven innovations will no longer languish for years as service 
providers struggle to access the capital needed to complement the limited 
funds currently available from government and philanthropy. Investors will 
have the opportunity to invest in a new product that allows them to fund 
solutions to major social problems, such as homelessness, in a way that was 
not available to them ever before. Government will be able to shift resources 
from costly remediation programs to more efficient prevention services. 
Most importantly, greater numbers of low-income and at-risk individuals 
and families will participate in effective programs that help them before 
problems become acute, stemming the increasingly unsustainable need for 
crisis-driven services. 
If the market grows, SIBs may also influence larger shifts within the 
nonprofit, government, and investing communities. This new source of 
capital, which relies on demonstrated results, will encourage nonprofits  
to develop robust data collection methods, create performance metrics, 
and measure social outcomes. With greater market discipline and 
transparency within the social sector, governments will have access to 
u
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better data that enable rigorous assessment of various program alternatives 
and inform responsible public investment. In addition, governments may 
begin to measure success using outcomes rather than outputs, driving 
greater accountability within the public sector. SIBs will also promote the 
transition from siloed government programs to broader thinking about how 
interventions in one area, such as housing, affect outcomes in another, like 
health care. Cross-agency collaboration will encourage better use of public 
resources and possibly advance new solutions to some of society’s most 
pervasive and intractable problems. Lastly, SIBs may influence the creation 
of additional impact investing products that similarly monetize social 
outcomes to calculate investor repayment and returns. 
While not a panacea, SIBs hold the promise of becoming a multi-billion 
dollar source of growth capital for the social sector. Although it is still early 
in their implementation, SIBs are poised to mobilize investment capital  
to advance social progress and create better outcomes for target 
beneficiaries. Conducting SIB pilots across issue areas and geographies 
will be essential in broadening our understanding of how they can be 
implemented most effectively.
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